The Armed Forces Journal recently published an article by Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis that assesses the state of the war in Afghanistan. Lt. Col. Davis wrote two versions of his assessment: a classified version for security-cleared personnel only, and a shorter unclassified version. The unclassified article is amazingly candid. Here are excerpts from the unclassified article.
By Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis, Armed Forces Journal, 07 February 2012
I spent last year in Afghanistan, visiting and talking with U.S. troops and their Afghan partners. … I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces.
What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground.
…
I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level.
…
I saw the incredible difficulties any military force would have to pacify even a single area of any of those provinces; I heard many stories of how insurgents controlled virtually every piece of land beyond eyeshot of a U.S. or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) base.
I saw little to no evidence the local governments were able to provide for the basic needs of the people. Some of the Afghan civilians I talked with said the people didn’t want to be connected to a predatory or incapable local government.
…
I observed Afghan Security forces collude with the insurgency.
…
Much of what I saw during my deployment, let alone read or wrote in official reports, I can’t talk about; the information remains classified. But I can say that such reports – mine and others’ – serve to illuminate the gulf between conditions on the ground and official statements of progress.
…
In August, I went on a dismounted patrol with troops in the Panjwai district of Kandahar province. … One of the unit’s senior officers rhetorically asked me, “How do I look these men in the eye and ask them to go out day after day on these missions? What’s harder: How do I look [my soldier's] wife in the eye when I get back and tell her that her husband died for something meaningful? How do I do that?”
…
On Sept. 11, the 10th anniversary of the infamous attack on the U.S., I visited [a] unit in Kunar province, this one near the town of Asmar. I talked with the local official who served as the cultural adviser to the U.S. commander. Here’s how the conversation went:
Davis: “Here you have many units of the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF]. Will they be able to hold out against the Taliban when U.S. troops leave this area?”
Adviser: “No. They are definitely not capable. Already all across this region [many elements of] the security forces have made deals with the Taliban. [The ANSF] won’t shoot at the Taliban, and the Taliban won’t shoot them.
…
In all of the places I visited, the tactical situation was bad to abysmal. If the events I have described – and many, many more I could mention – had been in the first year of war, or even the third or fourth, one might be willing to believe that Afghanistan was just a hard fight, and we should stick it out. Yet these incidents all happened in the 10th year of war.
…
I’m hardly the only one who has noted the discrepancy between official statements and the truth on the ground.
…
If Americans were able to compare the public statements many of our leaders have made with classified data, this credibility gulf would be immediately observable. Naturally, I am not authorized to divulge classified material to the public. But I am legally able to share it with members of Congress. I have accordingly provided a much fuller accounting in a classified report to several members of Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, senators and House members.
…
When it comes to deciding what matters are worth plunging our nation into war and which are not, our senior leaders owe it to the nation and to the uniformed members to be candid – graphically, if necessary – in telling them what’s at stake and how expensive potential success is likely to be. U.S. citizens and their elected representatives can decide if the risk to blood and treasure is worth it.
Likewise when having to decide whether to continue a war, alter its aims or to close off a campaign that cannot be won at an acceptable price, our senior leaders have an obligation to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth and let the people decide what course of action to choose. That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. The American people deserve better than what they’ve gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years. Simply telling the truth would be a good start.
…
[Read entire article at Reader-Supported News]
[Read entire article at Armed Forces Journal]
Related Previous PeacePundit Posts
- Taliban Defiance Undiminished by bin Laden’s Death
- Osama bin Laden is Dead. Bring the Troops Home.
- History Repeats: Nine Afghan Kids Killed by Airstrike
- Karzai: Military Strategy in Afghanistan is Counterproductive
- Ten Reasons a Troop Surge in Afghanistan is a Mistake
- Memo to Obama, Clinton, and Gates: Stop Digging!
